German Panzer III tank on the advance in the Ukraine during Operation Barbarossa, summer 1941. Photographer: Artur Grimm.
There
are some that believe the sheer numerical superiority of the Red Army
and Allies doomed Germany to defeat less than two years after continent
wide war resumed in Europe late in 1939. For instance, the vast majority
of David Stahel's decade long work posits that the Wehrmacht in
general, but the German army (Heer) in particular, had shot their bolt
as early as August of 1941. In assessing such claims this article will
take a look at the primary component of the German army's striking power
- it's panzer divisions. More to the point, I shall examine the state
of the tank complement in those panzer divisions assigned to Operation
Barbarossa (the June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union) after the
campaign's first three months. In doing so, I hope to highlight one of
many elements (for instance manpower losses in the infantry divisions
would be another) that taken together can help readers understand for
themselves whether or not the Ostheer (German army in the east) was
beyond repair early in the fall of 1941.
The panzer divisions
ready to invade the Soviet Union late in June 1941 were at that time the
most powerful combined arms organizations in the world. For that
matter, the quality of the armor fleshing out those panzer divisions had
taken a quantum leap over that of the previous year. Whereas more than
half the panzers deployed in France during May of 1940 were light Panzer
I and II variants, by June of 1941 fully two thirds of each division's
panzer complement comprised the far more capable Pz 35/38t, Panzer
III/IV, and StuG (assault guns). Most importantly, the Panzer III,
arguably the main battle tank (MBT) of the German army in 1941, had been
significantly improved. On the eve of Barbarossa the Panzer III Ausf G
to J series served as the majority of medium tanks in Germany's
inventory (1,090 of 1,440 Panzer III).These upgraded Panzer III's
featured 30mm thicker frontal armor than their predecessors, offering
for greater protection. In terms of hitting power the 50mm L/42 cannon
represented a huge improvement over the old 37mm gun. From there, the
50mm L/60 main gun equipping the J model Panzer III's (see picture
accompanying this article) that went into production in April 1941 had
twice the muzzle velocity and thus penetrating power of even the L/42
gun.
In addition, each panzer division gained a motorized
infantry regiment. This had increased the division's ability to operate
in built up urban areas, guard it's flanks, sweep up bypassed centers of
resistance, hold terrain, and ward off counterattacks. Off-road
mobility also had improved as the number of half-tracks increased as did
firepower further supplemented by the addition of assault guns and
anti-aircraft battalions to the panzer divisions. Moreover, previous
TO&E calling for two light artillery battalions had been upgraded so
that each panzer division also deployed a heavy artillery battalion
including a dozen 100mm cannons and 150mm howitzers. As such, the June
1941 era panzer divisions represented a far better balance of infantry,
armor, artillery, supporting arms,and thus combined arms strength than
did the Polish/French campaign vintage panzer divisions.
In terms
of the number of tanks available, by June of 1941, and even with
Rommel's Afrika Corps taking 314 panzers, the German army still held a
surplus of 974 panzers and assault guns (including 490 Pz 35/38t, Panzer
III/IV, and StuG) - and this doesn't include the 312 armored fighting
vehicles produced by German factories in that same month. All told, the
German army had 6,052 tanks in June 1941 (including those in repair and
being upgraded). It's important to note here that sources vary in
regards to the actual numbers of panzers/assault guns in the nineteen
panzer divisions initially participating in Barbarossa. But, if one
excludes those tanks assigned to the forces fighting in the Arctic
Circle and includes the StuG assault guns assigned to the eleven assault
gun battalions deployed for Barbarossa as well as those weapons given
to the Waffen-SS motorized divisions and Motorized Infantry Regiment
Grossdeutschland; and if one then goes with the most reputable estimates
published we end up with over 3,500 panzer/assault guns deployed in
Eastern Europe. This number can be further broken down as follows: 337
Panzer I, 890 Panzer II, 155 Panzer 35(t), 625 Panzer 38(t), 973 Panzer
III, 439 Panzer IV, 225 Beflpz., 259 StuG. So that's what the Germans
were starting with when they invaded the Soviet Union. Now, let's fast
forward and look at that state of the panzer division's tank strength in
each of the three German Army Groups (North, Center, South) following
the brutal fighting that characterized Barbarossa's first three months.
If Stahel's thesis is correct then by late in August/early September
1941 these divisions should have become mere shells of their former
selves.
Let's start with Army Group North's Fourth Panzergruppe.
It began Barbarossa with three panzer divisions (the 1st, 6th, 8th)
equipped with 156, 256, and 223 panzers respectively. During the
campaign it would be reinforced by additional armored elements from Army
Group Center. However, by September 10th, or after Army Group North had
reached the gates of Leningrad and five days before the Fourth
Panzergruppe headquarters, the headquarters for three motorized corps,
and four panzer/motorized divisions began their transfer to Army Group
Center for Operation Typhoon, these three panzer divisions had lost 131
tanks as total write-offs (Totalausfalle). This meant that on September
10, 1941 the 1st, 6th, and 8th panzer divisions still retained 123, 196,
and 187 panzers or 79, 77, and 84 percent of their respective strengths
on June 21, 1941. Moreover, these three panzer division's retained
these strength levels in spite of receiving only two replacement tanks
from Germany during the entire first three plus months of the campaign.
Needless to say, this is hardly indicative of a panzer force in
collapse. More to the point, it's the first piece of evidence not only
challenging Stahel's claims but leaving us to wonder something else:
What had the German high command been doing with the surplus of
unassigned armor in Germany's tank park (remember this totalled nearly
1,000 armored fighting vehicles) accumulated on the eve of Barbarossa.
Perhaps the answer to that question lies in events elsewhere.
German
Army Group Center started Barbarossa as by far the strongest Army Group
the Wehrmacht had ever assembled. The Second Panzergruppe began
Barbarossa with 1,086 panzers in it's 3rd, 4th, 10th, 17th, and 18th
panzer divisions. Meanwhile, the Third Panzergruppe started the campaign
with 989 panzers in its 7th, 12th, 19th, and 20th panzer divisions.
Between June 22nd and early September these two panzer groups (and their
initial 2,075 panzers) had fought a series of massive battles as well
as penetrating hundreds of miles into the Soviet Union in dusty, hot
summer weather not at all friendly to tank engines. Overall, the heavy
fighting and rough conditions had resulted in the two panzer groups
writing off as completely destroyed (Totalausfalle) 641 tanks. Yet, in
spite of all of that by early September Army Group Center's two panzer
groups still had 1,480 panzers available or 71.3% of their initial
strength. What's more, only 67 of those tanks were replacement vehicles.
One interesting takeaway from this is that of the nearly 1,000 surplus
tanks in German stocks on the eve of Barbarossa and with German tank
production averaging several hundred tanks per month in the intervening
three months by early September of 1941 Army Group North and Army Group
Center had received a combined total of only 69 replacement tanks. Now
to be fair, at the end of September 1941 Army Group Center received from
OKH reserve the entire 2nd and 5th Panzer Divisions with 194 and 186
tanks respectively. In addition, Army Group's North (AGN) and South
(AGS) also dispatched three panzer divisions to Army Group Center in
September (the 1st and 6th from AGN and the 11th from AGS). Many of
these formations were quite strong. For instance the 11th Panzer
Division while fighting with Army Group South had started Barbarossa
with some 157 panzers, and yet it had only suffered permanent losses of
39 vehicles. This thus still leaves us wondering how it was that the
Ostheer was already irrepairably damaged. Maybe Army Group South had
been sucking up all the replacement tanks?
Army Group South began
Barbarossa spearheaded by the First Panzergruppe, which included a
powerful armored complement in the form of the 9th, 11th, 13th, 14th,
and 16th Panzer Divisions as well as two battalions of assault guns. All
told, 792 tanks and 42 StuG's. As is well known, the Soviet
Southwestern Front ranked among the Red Army's most powerful formations
in June of 1941. It did not fail to make the First Panzergruppe pay
dearly for it's advance deep into the Ukraine. By September of 1941 Army
Group South had lost 174 tanks as total write-offs. Nevertheless, early
in September of 1941 and with the receipt of 20 replacement tanks from
Germany First Panzergruppe still had 614 total available panzers of 78%
of it's original strength.
So here we are, early in September of
1941 and the three German Army Group's that had been fighting for three
and a half months still had on average well over three quarters of their
original strength. This, by the way, is remarkable in and of itself.
That's because tanks require a tremendous amount of maintenance to stay
in running condition. The lay person often forgets that if a panzer
division, or a U.S. armored division, or Soviet Tank Corps has an
establishment strength of a certain number that in all likelihood and
even in ideal conditions this number is almost never held once that unit
takes the field. During the Second World War armored units from all
nations moving under their own power at any distance greater than
relatively short ranges almost always experienced significant numbers of
broken down tanks. Even units equipped with the T-34 or M-4 Sherman,
the gold-standard of Second World War era tanks in terms of mechanical
reliability, often lost as much as twenty percent of their strength to
break downs (regardless of combat losses) on extended cross-country
operations over a period of days no less weeks or months.
Accordingly,
for the Ostheer's panzer divisions to be operating at an average of
three quarters their establishment strengths in armor following three
plus months of combat against the Red Army says quite a bit about the
supposed terminal decline those same panzer divisions had entered as of
the late summer of 1941. Furthermore, the Ostheer's Panzergruppe's were
maintaining these relatively high rates of available tanks in spite of
having received a mere 89 replacement tanks to replace the losses in
their original panzer divisions. Now, and to be fair, in September and
October of 1941 the German command finally sent 316 replacement panzers
to the Ostheer. But again this leaves unaddressed the question
surrounding the bulk of the surpluses, what had been done with them, and
thus why they weren't being used to maintain Barbarossa's panzer
divisions in peak operating condition.
Addressing that issue we
find a number of things happening. First off, the German high command
had decided to forgo fully reinforcing Barbarossa's panzer divisions in
order to pursue a number of competing and, in this author's opinion,
questionable and secondary initiatives. For instance, they had been
sending considerable numbers of replacement tanks to the Afrika Corp's
two panzer divisions. An Afrika Corps that was at that time doing little
more than fighting back and forth against the British and their
Commonwealth Allies to see who could control Mussolini's strategically
irrelevant Libyan colony. In addition, a larger number yet of Germany's
surplus tanks had been redirected to equipping new armored formations
being formed in the latter half of 1941, such as the 22nd, 23rd, and
24th Panzer Divisions. We also know additional tanks were delivered to
Germany's Axis allies - albeit these deliveries included only 184 mostly
obsolete models such as the Panzer 38(t). As to this last decision it
must be said that it greatly bolstered the strength of Germany's allies
and thus represented a wise and, given the numbers and quality of
vehicles involved, cheap investment.
Taking all of these
decisions together however, a larger picture emerges. For instance, in
terms of our understanding, does it seem more likely that Germany lacked
the productive capacity to maintain Barbarossa's existing panzer
divisions (an idea backed by quantitative based theorists like Stahel)
and a development that would mean every additional lost tank in Russia
truly represented a slow creeping disaster Germany could not overcome?
Or are we seeing that, on the other hand, the German high command had
decided to divert resources elsewhere at the expense of the most
important campaign in the Third Reich's history? The latter would fit
within a qualitative based approach to the war's ouctome as it
implicates the way Germany prosecuted the war as a primary factor in her
defeat, not the fact that she was massively outproduced by the Allies
and Soviet Union.
Now, going back and taking this information
presented so far we can see in regards to the Ostheer's panzer divisions
during the fall of 1941 that far from having shot their bolt the four
panzergruppe's deployed in Russia still retained formidable strength
when compared to their original complement of pre-Barbarossa panzers.
Furthermore, the only thing in September of 1941 standing between the
Ostheer's panzer division's fighting at 100% strength instead of roughly
75% strength in reality were the decisions made by Hitler and OKH/OKW
in terms of how they allocated the output of German factories producing
more than enough vehicles to keep the Ostheer's tank park fully supplied
if that is what they had wanted to accomplish. All of which is
indicative not of a Wehrmacht being ground into the dust under the
weight of Allied and Soviet numerical superiority as postulated by brute
force advocates such as David Stahel, but a German high command whose
own decision making was undermining the Axis war effort from within. All
of which once again leads us back to the fact that the numbers game
many use to show the hopelessness of the German position doesn't add up.
Nor does it work for producing a better understanding for why the
Second World War ended as it did.
Source :
https://www.globeatwar.com/article/state-barbarossas-panzer-divisions-fall-1941
https://www.reddit.com/r/WorldofTanks/comments/wcpo1q/ok_own_up_which_one_of_you_is_this_seen_on_rtinder/
White
winter camouflaged tanks of the 11. Panzer-Division in the village of
Matronino near Volokolamsk. On the left, the first and third are Panzer
III tanks, while between them and on the right is Panzer II tanks. The
picture was taken by Kriegsberichter Artur Grimm in Moscow area,
November 1941. From 31 October to 13–15 November 1941, the Wehrmacht
high command stood down while preparing to launch a second offensive
towards Moscow. Although Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre) still
possessed considerable nominal strength, its fighting capabilities had
thoroughly diminished because of wear and fatigue. While the Germans
were aware of the continuous influx of Soviet reinforcements from the
east as well as the presence of large reserves, given the tremendous
Soviet casualties, they did not expect the Soviets to be able to mount a
determined defense.
